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Abstract
Households in rural India are highly dependent on ﬁrewood as their main source of energy, partly because
non-biofuels tend to be expensive. The prevailing view is therefore that, when faced with shortages of
ﬁrewood in the village commons, such households, and especially the women in them, have to spend more
and more time searching for ﬁrewood and eventually settle for poorer-quality biomass such as twigs, branches
and dry leaves.
Using data from a random sample of rural households in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, we come
to very diﬀerent conclusions, however. We ﬁnd that households in villages with degraded forests do not
spend longer hours searching for ﬁrewood, but instead switch to either using ﬁrewood from private trees or
to using agricultural waste for fuel. In the long run, moreover, households respond to the ﬁrewood shortage
by altering the mix of private trees on their land in favor of ﬁrewood, as opposed to fruit, trees. We ﬁnd also
that, Joint Forest Management, a government program initiated in the 1990s, is having a positive impact on
the ﬁrewood economy.
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1. Introduction
Starting in the early 1970s, it was widely held that India would soon face a severe ﬁrewood
shortage. Demand for ﬁrewood, which together with animal dung and agricultural residue is one
of the main cooking fuels used by rural households, was thought to be leading to widespread forest
degradation. The degradation, it was believed, would soon be so severe that households would
face a ﬁrewood “famine” (Agarwal 1998). Natarajan (1990) reinforced this sense of an impending
ﬁrewood crisis by arguing that compared to relatively richer urban households, it was harder for
poor rural households to switch to costly non-biofuels such as kerosene and liqueﬁed petroleum
gas. Meanwhile, the rural livestock population remained stagnant, thereby oﬀering little prospect
of dung for fuel providing a cheap alternative, and a largely ineﬀective government program to
introduce more energy-eﬃcient cooking stoves was doing little to reduce the demand for ﬁrewood
(Natarajan 1990). These dire predictions conjured up images of households—and in particular
women—having to spend endless hours searching for ﬁrewood, and eventually settling for poorer-
quality biomass such as twigs, branches, and dry leaves.
Drawing on data collected in the early 1990s by the National Council for Applied Economic
Research in New Delhi (for more details see (Natarajan 1995)), Agarwal (1998) questioned the
validity of some of these previous predictions. Twenty years after the ﬁrst warnings of a crisis,
rural households were still found to use ﬁrewood as their main cooking fuel. Moreover, households
had not been forced to switch to poorer-quality biomass. In fact, the percentage of rural households
using logs, a superior type of biomass, was found to have increased over time. Also, fewer households
were found to be collecting ﬁrewood from the village commons, and more were collecting ﬁrewood
from trees grown on their own lands. In short, the ﬁrewood crisis had not come to be by the early
1990s.
Two possible reasons were put forward by Agarwal to explain the apparent increase in the supply
of logs. One was the invasion of exotic woody plant specie, such as Prosopis juliﬂora, which are
non-browsable and can be heavily lopped for ﬁrewood. Agarwal noted, however, that this invasion
had largely been on public lands and could therefore not explain the observed increase in the supply
of logs from private lands. The second possible reason was that farmers had reacted to the ﬁrewood
crisis by starting to grow more trees on their own lands, a practice promoted by a state-sponsored
farm forestry project in the 1980s (Saxena and Ballabh 1995). Agarwal noted, however, that no2
study to date had investigated this response, and that the farm forestry project had declined in
importance in the 1990s.
What, then, has since happened to the ﬁrewood crisis, especially given the demise of the
farm forestry project? If ﬁrewood shortages have developed, how are households—and especially
women—coping? Are they spending more time collecting ﬁrewood from the commons in areas
where forest lands are degraded? Are they substituting towards ﬁrewood collected from their own
land, or towards alternative biofuels such as dung and crop residues? What, if any, has been the
role of Joint Forest Management (JFM), a government program initiated in the mid-1990s under
which the state agrees to share forest produce—ﬁrewood, timber, as well as fodder—from state-
owned forest lands with villagers in return for their participation in the management of these lands
(Khare, Sarin, Saxena, Palit, Bathla, Vania and Satyanarayana 2000)?
In this paper we examine these questions using data collected from 539 households in 60 villages
in the Jhabua district of the state of Madhya Pradesh, covering the period from June 2000 to
May 2001. The data include gender-speciﬁc information on time spent collecting ﬁrewood from the
commons, the quantity of ﬁrewood collected, the quantity of ﬁrewood produced from own land, as
well as the quantities of animal dung and agricultural residue used for fuel. Moreover, 21 of the
villages have JFM projects.
As we discuss in the next section, the more recent literature—which is very limited in scope, and
based largely on anecdotal evidence and case studies—does in fact point to a developing ﬁrewood
crisis in India. Women are reported to be spending more time collecting ﬁrewood in villages
with degraded forests, households are found to be unable to cope with the crisis by switching to
alternative fuels, and JFM is said to be restricting women’s access to forests and thereby aggravating
the ﬁrewood crisis. Our data, however, paints a very diﬀrent picture. We ﬁnd that fewer women
choose to collect ﬁrewood from the village commons in villages with degraded forests. These
households are able to cope with the shortage of ﬁrewood by using crop residues as cooking fuel
and by planting more ﬁrewood trees, as opposed to fruit trees, on their lands and thereby producing
more ﬁrewood privately. Finally, JFM does appear to be easing the ﬁrewood crisis in Jhabua. In
villages with JFM projects, women are more likely to collect ﬁrewood from the village commons,
and spend less time collecting essentially the same quantity of ﬁrewood.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the more recent, post-1990
literature on the ﬁrewood crisis in India. Section 3 describes our study site and provides some3
background information about Joint Forest Management projects. Section 4 outlines a theoretical
model that forms the basis of our empirical model. Section 5 outlines the empirical model, the
estimation techniques, and then describes the data. Section 6 discusses the results and section 7
concludes.
2. Literature Review
Studies of household fuel use, based on data from the 1990s, have continued to ﬁnd that ﬁrewood
and animal dung are the dominant fuels used by households in rural India (ESMAP 2003), and
that there is little evidence of an energy transition occurring. According to a 1993-1994 survey
by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), an entity of the central Indian government,
over 80% of rural households use ﬁrewood as their primary energy source for cooking and lighting,
while another 10% use dung as such. A 1999-2000 NSO survey found that the ﬁrst percentage had
fallen to 75%, and that the diﬀerence was made up by an uptake in liquid petroleum gas. The
share of dung, meanwhile, had remained stable at 10%.
1
The only other study of fuel switching in rural India that we are aware of is that by Heltberg,
Arndt and Sekhar (2000), which considers the extent to which households in rural Rajasthan cope
with the ﬁrewood crisis by switching from ﬁrewood collected from common forests to private fuels.
The latter are deﬁned as a combination of ﬁrewood from private lands, agricultural residue, and
animal dung. The authors ﬁnd that households do not increase their use of private fuels in areas
with degraded forests. Households with larger landholdings and a larger number of trees on their
lands do collect less ﬁrewood from common forest lands and use more private fuels, but this is
found to be true irrespective of the state of the local forests. Studies using data from Nepal do
ﬁnd that households in some areas are able to cope with ﬁrewood scarcity in common forest lands
by switching to agricultural residue (Amacher, Hyde and Joshee 1993) or to ﬁrewood from private
trees (Cooke 2000).
As for the relationship between time spent in ﬁrewood collection and ﬁrewood availability, evi-
dence on this relationship in India is largely anecdotal. A number of studies point to the fact that
women devote a signiﬁcant amount of time per day to the collection of ﬁrewood (Laxmi, Parikh,
Karmakar and Dabrase 2003), but fail to link time spent to the state of the local forests. An ex-
ception is the study by Heltberg et al. (2000), using data collected in the Indian state of Rajasthan
1The NSSO survey did not ask about the amount of agricultural residue used as fuel.4
in the late 1990s, which ﬁnds that households as a whole spend more time in collection in villages
with more degraded forests.
Additional evidence comes from three studies in neighboring Nepal. Using data from the Nepal
Energy and Nutrition Survey conducted in the early 1980s, Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988) and Cooke
(1998) both ﬁnd that women devote more time to the collection of forest resources—ﬁrewood and
fodder—in villages with degraded forests. Using data from the late 1980s, Amacher, Hyde and
Kanel (1996) ﬁnd, however, that time spent in collection increases in the marginal productivity of
such time, where the latter serves as a proxy for ﬁrewood availability in the commons. Contrary to
Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988) and Cooke (1998), therefore, households in the Amacher et al. (1996)
study spend less time collecting resources in villages where forests are degraded.
A shortcoming of all four studies discussed above is that in the regressions used to estimate
the relationship between time spent collecting and forest degradation, the measures of ﬁrewood
availability are indirect and likely endogenous. Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988) and Heltberg et al.
(2000) use the time needed to collect a ﬁxed quantity (20 kilograms and 1 kilogram, respectively) of
ﬁrewood as their measure of timber scarcity, while Cooke (1998) uses the same measure multiplied
by the imputed female wage rate. Since unobservable, household-level characteristics that aﬀect
the total time spent in collection are likely to aﬀect the time spent collecting a ﬁxed quantity of
ﬁrewood in the same direction, these measures of scarcity are likely endogenous, and possibly biased
towards ﬁnding the result that these studies report (i.e., that time spent collecting increases with
scarcity).
2 Similarly, unobservable, household-level characteristics that aﬀect the total time spent
in collection are also likely to aﬀect the marginal productivity of such time, and again in the same
direction. The measure employed by Amacher et al. (1993) is therefore also likely endogenous, and
possibly biased towards ﬁnding the result that their study reports (i.e., that time spent collecting
decreases with scarcity). In contrast to these studies, our paper uses a direct physical measure of
ﬁrewood availability, namely, the volume of biomass available per household in the village.
As for JFM, very few studies have documented the impact of this government program on either
the ﬁrewood crisis or household incomes. This is surprising given how widespread the program
has become: according to Sarin, Singh, Sundar and Bhogal (2003), as of October 2001, 27 out of
2Brouwer, Hoorweg and van Liere (1997), in studying the responses of households in rural Malawi to ﬁrewood
shortages, note that “...distance to collection place and collection time are not reliable indicators of ﬁrewood shortages
as so often postulated in the literature.” In their study, households with relatively more adult females are found to
travel further and more frequently than households in the same village with fewer adult females. Collection time for
these households is therefore not correlated with physical scarcity of the resource.5
28 Indian states had issued JFM orders, and 18% of India’s total forest area had been brought
under the purview of JFM. The studies that do exist again rely mostly on anecdotal evidence,
and oﬀer conﬂicting views. Some contend that JFM has lead to an increase in the amount of
ﬁrewood collected by the household ((Pathan, Arul and Poﬀenberger 1900), (Banyopadhyay and
Shyamsunder 2006)); others argue that, by placing restrictions on the amount of ﬁrewood that can
be harvested and by emphasizing timber beneﬁts over ﬁrewood beneﬁts, JFM has placed additional
hardships on women because they have to walk further to collect ﬁrewood (Khare et al. 2000).
3
3. Study Site
Household- and village-level data analyzed in this paper was collected from a random sample of
539 households living in 60 diﬀerent villages in the district of Jhabua in the Indian state of Madhya
Pradesh (for more information on the data collection process, see Narain, Gupta and van ’t Veld
(2005)).
Jhabua is a semi-arid hilly region lying in the southwest corner of the state of Madhya Pradesh.
Compared to other Indian districts, Jhabua is sparsely populated, with 1.3 million people living
on 6,793km2. The district’s population is largely rural, with only 9% living in urban areas and
the rest in 1,313 villages, and largely tribal or indigenous, with only 14% of the population being
classiﬁed as non-tribal. Jhabua is also a poor district, with 47% of the population living below the
poverty line, and with low rates of literacy (information from the Madhya Pradesh government’s
website on Jhabua—www.jhabua.nic.in/default.htm).
Agriculture is the main occupation of households in Jhabua, with over 90% of the workforce
employed in this sector (HDR 1998). The kharif, or main agricultural season, runs from June
through October and thereby spans the monsoon months July and August. The rabi, or winter
agricultural season, runs from November through March. Whether or not households in fact engage
in any agriculture during the rabi season depends in large part on the strength of the monsoons,
because agriculture in Jhabua is mainly rain-fed. Finally, the summer season is made up of the
months of April and May, two months where there is little economic activity in the village. The
household- and village-level data used in this paper was collected for the period June 2000 to May
2001 and therefore spanned all three seasons—kharif, rabi, and summer.
3Kohlin and Parks (2001) consider the impact of a diﬀerent state-initiated program, which promotes the establishment
of plantations on village common lands (so called village woodlots). The authors ﬁnd that these woodlots have helped
increase the supply of ﬁrewood. This program, however, is not as prevalent as JFM.6
As for land use, 54% of the total land area in Jhabua is classiﬁed as agricultural land, 19% as
forest land, and the rest as “degraded” land (HDR 1998). These forest lands are considered to be
state property and have traditionally been managed by the state forest department to maximize
timber revenue. Only about 50% of the total forest area currently has any vegetative cover, and the
majority of that is low-density forests (for the history of forest degradation in Jhabua, see TERI
(2000)). Nevertheless, households all over Jhabua depend on these forests as well as on other village
common lands for ﬁrewood, construction wood, fodder, and other minor forest products. In fact,
villagers have been given rights, called nistar, that permit households to collect forest products
from state forest lands for non-commercial household use (PRNRM 2002a).
3.1. Joint Forest Management. Forest degradation is and has been a problem in large parts
of India, not just in Jhabua. The 1988 Forest Policy, laid down by the Government of India,
recognized this problem and called for the development of a new forest management system that
would involve local people and would also be geared towards meeting their needs. These changes,
it was hoped, would reverse years of alienation of local villagers from the management of forest
lands, one of the factors said to be responsible for years of degradation (Sarin et al. 2003). The new
policy was implemented through a circular issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests on
June 1, 1990 (GOI 1990), and came to be known as Joint Forest Management (JFM). The Madhya
Pradesh government passed its ﬁrst JFM order in 1991 and the program was formally initiated in
Jhabua the following year.
Though some details vary from state to state, under JFM the state forest department agrees to
share forest produce from state-owned forest lands with local villagers in return for their participa-
tion in the management of these forest lands. Villagers are allowed to collect dry and fallen branches
for ﬁrewood, are given access to wood removed during thinning operations, are permitted to gather
fodder and minor forest products, and are given a share of the ﬁnal timber harvest. Collection is,
however, meant for domestic needs and not for commercial sale. In return, villagers participate
in the development of forest working plans, agree to protect the forests against encroachment and
timber smuggling, and agree to restrict their use of certain forest products (Khare et al. 2000).7
In Madhya Pradesh, as in most states, JFM was initiated on forest lands that were degraded.
Unlike most other states, however, Madhya Pradesh amended its policy in 1995 to allow well-
stocked forest areas to be eligible for JFM.4 Also in 1995, the World Bank initiated a large forestry
project in Madhya Pradesh that gave a considerable boost to the state’s JFM program. The project
channeled large sums of money to JFM committees for so-called “village development activities,”
meaning activities that aimed at reducing the dependence of households on local forests. The
project’s ﬁrst phase ended in 1999, and by mid-2000 about 38% of the state’s total forest area was
being managed under JFM ((MPFD Undated) cited by (Sarin et al. 2003)).
3.2. Evaluation of JFM. A number of studies have evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the
institutions established under JFM. By and large, these studies argue that people’s “participation”
under JFM has been limited. State forest departments have made little eﬀort to engage villagers in
forest management and have done little to incorporate the priorities of forest-dependent households
in forest management goals. These criticisms have also been directed at JFM in Madhya Pradesh.
A case study by (Sarin et al. 2003) of 13 villages in the Bastar district and Harda forest divisio
of Madhya Pradesh, revealed limited participation by villagers in JFM committees, especially by
women and other disempowered groups. Villagers were found to have little knowledge of the
decisionmaking process, and therefore little say in the management of the local forests, or for that
matter in the management of funds targeted for village development activities. Other studies that
have found institutional deﬁciencies with JFM in Madhya Pradesh include a a two-year study in
the district of Dewas, by the University of Edinburgh (PRNRM 2002b), and a study providing a
mid-term review of the World Bank’s forestry project. The latter review pointed especially to the
corruption surrounding the use of village development funds ((PRNRM 2002b) (Sundar, Roger and
Thin 2001)).
Aside from these institutional studies, few studies have documented the impact that JFM has
had on the ﬁrewood crisis, or for that matter on household incomes. Based on their case study,
Sarin et al. (2003) argue that restrictions placed under JFM, on the extraction of ﬁrewood and
animal grazing, especially in the early years of the program, have placed undue burdens on poor
households.5 The authors also claim, on the other hand, that in villages in the Harda forest division,
4Village institutions established to manage forest in well-stocked areas are called van suraksha samities (forest pro-
tection committees) while those in degraded areas are called gram van samities (village forest committees) (Sarin et
al. 2003).
5Similar criticisms have been raised by local tribal organizations ((PRNRM 2002b)).8
funds made available for village development, and speciﬁcally for irrigation development, did lead
to improvements in agricultural productivity. None of these impacts were quantiﬁed, however.
Similarly, the mid-term review of the World Bank project noted that JFM was leading to forest
regeneration but did not document what beneﬁts this regeneration was conferring on villagers
(PRNRM 2002b).
4. Theoretical Model
Our empirical analysis of the relationship between time spent in ﬁrewood collection and forest
degradation is informed by the following theoretical model.
Consider a representative farm household that derives utility from the consumption of a cooked
staple and from the consumption of fruit. The cooked staple is produced by combining the raw
staple with ﬁrewood, and by substituting the production function into the household’s utility
function, we obtain the derived utility function
U = U(ca,cf,cr),
where ca denotes consumption of the raw staple, cf consumption of ﬁrewood, and cr the consump-
tion of fruit. Note that by not explicitly including the time input required for cooking, we implicitly
treat this time input as ﬁxed.
The household allocates some of its time and some of its land to production of the raw staple.
The agricultural production function is
qa = qa(ta,La),
where ta is the time spent on the farm, La is the amount of own land used for the production of
the staple. The household also allocates some of its time to collecting ﬁrewood from the commons.





where tf is the time spent collecting, and F
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c denotes the stock of ﬁrewood in the commons. The







p is the stock of private ﬁrewood trees. Lastly, the household may produce fruit privately






p is the stock of private fruit trees. Given that households are likely to live close to their
agricultural ﬁelds, we do not explicitly consider the time spent collecting either ﬁrewood or fruit
from private trees.




p + wtw + v = ca + pfcf + prcr, (1)
where pf is the market price of ﬁrewood, pr the market price of fruit, w the wage rate, tw the time
spent in wage labor, and v the household’s exogenous income. Note that we are treating the staple
as the numeraire, so pa = 1. Also, we are assuming that markets exist for the staple, ﬁrewood,
and fruit, and therefore that consumption of these commodities is not constrained to equal their
production by the household. In particular, a household can meet its desired consumption of
ﬁrewood by collecting it from the commons, collecting it from its private trees, or purchasing it on
the market.
To simplify the analysis, we treat leisure time as ﬁxed, so that the household’s time constraint is
T = ta + tf + tw. (2)




p = L. (3)
Lastly, although households may purchase ﬁrewood, we assume that they never sell ﬁrewood on




This assumed asymmetry is consistent with our data set: out of a total of 539 households in our
ﬁnal sample, over a hundred purchase ﬁrewood but only one household—a single male owning very
little land—sells any. This may be explained by the existence of large ﬁxed costs associated with
selling ﬁrewood, promoting specialization.10




p, and La, subject to constraints (1) through (3), as well as non-
negativity constraints on tf,tw,F
f
p , and Fr
p. Note that by assuming tw ≥ 0, we abstract from the
possibility of hiring labor to either work on the land or collect ﬁrewood. We also assume that
ca,cf,cr,ta and La are always strictly positive.
The Lagrangian associated with this optimization problem is
L = U(ca,cf,cr)
+ λB[qa(ta,La) + pfqf
c(tf,Ff
c ) + pfqf
p(Ff
p ) + prqr
p(Fr
p) + wtw + v − ca − pfcf − prcr]
+ λT[T − ta − tf − tw]
+ λF[L − La − Ff
p − Fr
p]
+ µc[cf − qf
c(tf,Ff
c ) − qf
p(Ff
p )]
+ µttf + µwtw + µfFf
p + µrFr
p,
4.1. Interpreting the First-Order Conditions. As we show in appendix A, the ﬁrst-order













































∂La + µr = 0, (10)
The ﬁrst two conditions help determine the household’s optimal consumption of the staple, ﬁrewood,
and fruit. If the household buys any ﬁrewood from the market (so µc = 0), then equation 5 implies
that the household equates the marginal utility per rupee of ﬁrewood and staple consumption. If,
on the other hand, it does not buy any ﬁrewood (µw > 0), then at the prevailing prices its marginal
utility per rupee of ﬁrewood must fall short of that of staple consumption. Similarly, equation 611
implies that the household chooses quantities of the staple and fruit so as to equate the marginal
utility per rupee of fruit and staple consumption.
The next two conditions help determine how the household allocates its labor between agricul-
tural production, ﬁrewood collection, and wage employment. If the household collects any ﬁrewood
(so µt = 0), then equation 7 implies that it equates the marginal utility per hour of time spent
collecting to that of time spent working on the farm. Similarly, equation 8 implies that if the
household engages in wage labor (so µw = 0), then it equates the marginal utility of time spent
working on the farm to that of working for wages.
The ﬁnal two conditions help determine how the household allocates land to either agriculture
or private ﬁrewood and fruit trees. Speciﬁcally, if the household plants any private ﬁrewood trees
(so µf = 0), it equates the marginal utility of consumption of ﬁrewood produced from those trees
to that of consumption of the staple produced from its land, and similarly for fruit trees.
4.2. Model Results. The question that is the main focus of this paper is how forest degradation,
i.e., a reduction in the stock of ﬁrewood in the commons, F
f
c , aﬀects the amount of time that the
household devotes to ﬁrewood collection from the commons, tf, and the number of ﬁrewood trees
that it plants on its own land, F
f
p .
The theoretical model allows us to answer this question for a wide range of cases, distinguished
by what combination of the 5 multipliers µc, µt, µw, µf and µr is zero. In appendix B, we restrict
attention to the subset of cases where µc = µt = 0, i.e., the household purchases at least some
ﬁrewood from the market, but also collects some ﬁrewood from the commons. We show that if in
addition we assume that the household engages in wage labor, so that µw = 0 (cases I and II in the
appendix), then a decrease in ﬁrewood biomass in the commons unambiguously induces a reduction
in the time spent collecting, with an equal increase in the time spent working for wages. The change
in biomass does not aﬀect the time spent working on the farm, however, nor the number of either
ﬁrewood or fruit trees planted privately, nor thereby the amount of land allocated to trees.
If, on the other hand, the household does not engage in wage labor, so that µw > 0 (cases III
through VI), then a decrease in ﬁrewood biomass in the commons again unambiguously induces
a reduction in the time spent collecting, but now induces an equal increase in the time spent
working on the farm. Moreover, it also induces an increase in the amount of land allocated to
agriculture, with a corresponding reduction in the number of ﬁrewood and fruit trees planted
privately. Intuitively, the increase in time spent working on the farm in favor of time spent collecting12
ﬁrewood results in an increased productivity of agricultural land relative to that of land planted
with private trees. To restore equilibrium, the household reallocates land from trees to agriculture.
While these comparative-statics results do not exhaust all possible theoretical cases, they in-
dicate, at least, that there is no a priori reason to expect decreased ﬁrewood availability in the
commons to necessarily induce an increase in time spent collecting. Under plausible conditions,
the opposite may well be true. In the next section, we turn to our data to examine this issue
empirically.
5. Empirical Analysis
In order to examine the diﬀerent responses of households to variations in forest biomass across
the villages in our sample, we estimate equations for the amount of time spent by households in
ﬁrewood collection, for the quantities of ﬁrewood, agricultural residue, and dung used by households,
and for the number of ﬁrewood and fruit trees that households plant on their own lands. The
ﬁrst of these equations, which we are able to estimate separately for men, women, and children,
allows us to examine whether, as forests degrade, households—and particularly women within those
households—spends more time collecting ﬁrewood. The fuel use equations allow us to analyze the
extent to which, as forests degrade, households switch either to alternative sources of ﬁrewood, such
as private supplies or the market, or to alternative fuels, such as dung and agricultural residue.
Finally, the ﬁrewood- and fruit-tree equations allow us to examine whether, as forests degrade,
households grow more ﬁrewood trees on their private lands.
5.1. Empirical Strategy. The two main data issues that we have to confront in estimating these
equations are those of censoring and seasonality.
The dependent variable in almost all the equations we estimate is censored. Not all households
choose to collect any ﬁrewood from the commons, for example, and not all households have any
trees, especially ﬁrewood trees, on their land. Three common regression models used to account
for such censoring are the Tobit model, the Heckman two-step selection model, and the two-part
model. Of these, the Tobit model is the most restrictive, as it imposes the assumption that the
participation equation (i.e., the process that determines whether or not the dependent variable
is censored) is identical to the outcome equation (the process that determines the value of the
dependent variable if it is not censored). The Heckman two-step model relaxes this assumption,
but has the well-known drawback of relying on essentially arbitrary functional form assumptions13
for identiﬁcation if the same set of regressors is used in both equations. In general, it is diﬃcult to
come up with plausible arguments for not including the same set of regressors, however, and this
is true in the setting of our study as well. Below, we report results for the two-part model alone;
our results are generally robust across all three models, however.
A further issue is the existence of important seasonal diﬀerences in the choices that the household
makes with regards to time allocation and fuel consumption. Fortunately, we have data on several
of these choices at the seasonal level, with three observations for each household: one for the
kharif (main harvest) season, one for the rabi (secondary harvest) season, and one for the summer
(dry) season. We are therefore able to take seasonal diﬀerences into account by including seasonal
dummies in panel regressions. This has the additional advantage that we can control, to some
extent, for unobserved household-speciﬁc eﬀects. Because many of our regressors are not available
at the seasonal level—including, in particular, our estimate of forest biomass—we adopt a random-
eﬀects speciﬁcation for these regressions, however, which assumes that the unobserved household-
speciﬁc eﬀects are not correlated with the regressors. Hausman tests comparing ﬁxed and random-
eﬀects speciﬁcations fail to reject this assumption.
5.2. Description of Variables. Household time-allocation decisions, fuel-consumption choices,
and decisions to plant private ﬁrewood and fruit trees depend on a number of household- and
village-speciﬁc variables. Table 1 lists the household-speciﬁc endogenous variables that we examine
below, while Table 2 lists household- and village-speciﬁc exogenous variables.
6. Empirical Results
6.1. Seasonal Diﬀerences. The regression estimates for time spent collecting ﬁrewood from the
commons (see Table 3) and for fuel use (see Table 6) reveal strong seasonal diﬀerences. The probit
random-eﬀects regressions reported in Table 3 estimate whether or not the household in fact spends
any time collecting ﬁrewood. We estimate these equations separately for the household as a whole
(P.COL.H) and for the men, women, and children within each household (P.COL.M, P.COL.F,
and P.COL.C). The ordinary random-eﬀects regressions reported in the same table estimate the
determinants of the log of the time spent collecting (net of time taken to travel to and from the
collection site), conditional on this time being positive, again separately for the household as a whole
(L.COL.H) and for the men, women, and children within each household (L.COL.M, L.COL.F, and
L.COL.C).14
Similarly, the probit random-eﬀects regressions reported in Table 7 estimate whether or not the
household in fact collects any ﬁrewood (P.FWD.COL), purchases any ﬁrewood (P.FWD.PUR) or
consumes any dung for fuel (P.DFU.CON), while the ordinary random-eﬀects regressions estimate
the determinants of the log of the quantities of ﬁrewood collected (L.FWD.COL), ﬁrewood pur-
chased (L.FWU.PUR), or dung for fuel consumed (L.DFU.CON), conditional on these quantities
being positive.6
The coeﬃcients on the KHARIF and SUMMER seasonal dummies in the probit equations of
Table 3 as well as the ﬁrst probit equation of Table 6 indicate that households are less likely
to collect ﬁrewood in the kharif season, which has high rainfall relative to the rabi season (the
excluded category), and more likely to collect in the dry summer season. This is also indicated by
the coeﬃcient on the actual level of rainfall in each of the seasons, which is negative and signiﬁcant
in the probit equations for the household as a whole (as well as in the probit equation for time
spent collecting by women). A likely explanation for these ﬁndings is that higher rainfall increases
the marginal product of labor in the household’s main occupation, namely agriculture, thereby
increasing the opportunity cost of time spent collecting ﬁrewood. Another possible explanation is
that households prefer to collect dry rather than wet ﬁrewood.
The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the summer dummy in the probit equation for ﬁrewood
purchases in Table 6 indicates that households are also more likely to buy ﬁrewood in the summer
relative to the rabi season.
Interviews from the ﬁeld reveal that households in fact store ﬁrewood in the summer for the
succeeding kharif season, which is typically the main agricultural season. Apart from the higher
opportunity cost of time in the kharif, a further reason for such storage is that biofuel substitutes
are less available in the kharif. Agricultural residue for fuel becomes available only in the rabi season
following the main kharif harvest, or in the summer following the secondary rabi harvest. Moreover,
any animal dung collected during the kharif season is more likely to be applied to agricultural ﬁelds
as manure at the beginning of the rabi season, just as dung collected in the summer season is
applied to the ﬁelds in the following kharif season. It is only in the rabi season, preceding the
summer, that there is no demand for manure, so that dung collected during the rabi can be used
6The minor discrepancy between the coeﬃcients in the participation equations for time spent collecting and quantity
collected arises because two households reported collecting a positive amount of ﬁrewood, but requiring essentially
no time to do so. Accordingly, the number of observations in the conditional outcome equations diﬀers slightly as
well.15
as cooking fuel. The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on both the kharif and summer dummies
in the probit equation for consumption of dung for fuel in Table 6 is consistent with this.
The same trends show up also in simple tabulations by season of the number of households that
collect ﬁrewood from the commons, purchase ﬁrewood, or use dung for fuel (see Table 5), pointing
to the importance of analyzing household ﬁrewood collection and fuel use at the seasonal level.
6.2. Time Spent Collecting Firewood from the Commons. Two general features of the
equations reported in Table 3 for time spent collecting ﬁrewood is that very few of the regressors
enter signiﬁcantly into the estimated equations for men and children, and that the results for the
household as a whole appear to be driven by those for women. Both features are explained by the
relatively small numbers of men and children that collect: the job of collecting ﬁrewood clearly
falls mainly on women. As the coeﬃcients on the proportion of females (PROP.F) and children
(PROP.C) in each household indicate, men are more likely to collect in households where there are
relatively few women and children, while children are more likely to collect in households in which
there are relatively many children.
A key result in these regressions is that the coeﬃcient on the log of per-capita biomass availability
(L.BIO) is positive and signiﬁcant in the participation equations for both the household as a whole
and for women in particular, but is not statistically signiﬁcant at even the 10% level in any of
the conditional outcome equations. Higher biomass availability in a village makes households, and
especially the women in those households, more likely to collect ﬁrewood from the commons, but
does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the time spent collecting (conditional on collecting at all).
One possible interpretation of this result is that, contrary to some of the claims discussed in the
introduction about a looming rural ‘ﬁrewood crisis’, households in villages with relatively degraded
forests are able to switch to substitutes for ﬁrewood from the commons; that is, they are not
forced to signiﬁcantly increase the time spent collecting, and in fact are more likely to simply
abandon collecting altogether. Some evidence in support of this interpretation (additional evidence
is reported below) comes from the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the log of private ﬁrewood
trees owned (L.FWD.TR) in the participation equations for households as a whole and for women,
and in the conditional outcome equation for women.
Two likely proxies for the opportunity cost of time spent in ﬁrewood collection—the average
distance to agricultural markets (MKTDIS.AGR) and the level of education of the head of the
household (HEAD.EDU)—enter signiﬁcantly in the participation equations, with the expected sign.16
Households in villages that are remote from markets and households with less-educated household
heads are likely to have fewer outside labor opportunities, and are therefore more likely to spend
time collecting. Conversely, households with more land and more farm capital (as measured by
the product of the log of land and the log of the value of capital, L.LAND×L.CAP) are less likely
to collect, as the opportunity cost of time spent collecting rather than working the farm is likely
higher for such households.
Apart from the average depth of the water table (AV.DEP), the eﬀect of is diﬃcult to interpret,
the only other regressors that enter signiﬁcantly into the conditional outcome equations are the
distance to the nearest market for ﬁrewood, and an interaction term between biomass per household
and the presence in the village of a JFM project. As one would expect, households spend less time
collecting in villages where ﬁrewood is available from nearby markets. For reasons to be discussed
below, households also spend less time collecting, but are more likely to collect, in villages with
JFM projects and high levels of per-household biomass (L.BIO.H).
6.3. Fuel Use. Tables 6 and 7 present the results on household fuel use.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of biomass availability in the commons (L.BIO) on fuel use. As noted
before, the positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on biomass in the ﬁrst column of Table 6 shows
that fewer households collect ﬁrewood from the commons as forests degrade. In the last column
of the table, the positive and weakly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on biomass in the equation for the log
of dung consumption for fuel (L.DFU.CON) indicates that as forests degrade, households also use
less dung. This then raises the question how do households meet their demand for fuel.
Table 7 provides some suggestion that they do so by collecting ﬁrewood from private trees
and by using agricultural residues for fuel. The coeﬃcient on biomass is negative and signiﬁcant
in the probit regressions for both private ﬁrewood consumption and consumption of agricultural
residue for fuel. As is to be expected, both the likelihood that households collect ﬁrewood from
private trees and the amount of private ﬁrewood they collect increase in the (log of the) number of
private trees owned by the household (L.FWD.TR and L.FRU.TR).7 Not surprising either is that
both the likelihood that households use agricultural residue for fuel and the amount that they use
increase in the amount of land cultivated by the household (as captured by the interaction eﬀect
L.LAND×L.CAP), or that, as shown in Table 6, both the likelihood of using dung for fuel and the
amount used increase the (log of the) number of animals owned by the household (L.ANIMAL).
7Although no fruit is collected from ﬁrewood trees, some ﬁrewood is commonly collected from fruit trees.17
As for purchases of ﬁrewood, the third and fourth column of Table 6 indicate that households
that own private trees are less likely to buy ﬁrewood. Reassuringly, for households that do buy,
the quantity bought declines in the price.
Other determinants of household fuel-use choices are the level of education of the household
head and the level of water scarcity in the village. As already noted above, households with
more educated household heads are less likely to collect ﬁrewood from the commons. The probit
equation in the ﬁfth column of Table 6 indicates that they are also less likely to consume dung
for fuel, but the remaining equations in the fuel-use tables suggest that they are no more likely to
collect private ﬁrewood, purchase ﬁrewood on the market, or use agricultural residue for fuel. One
possible explanation for these results is that these households meet more of their fuel demand from
non-biofuels such as kerosene or LPG. Unfortunately, our data set does not contain information on
non-biofuel use, so we cannot conﬁrm if this is in fact the case.
A ﬁnal result concerns the eﬀect on fuel use choices of long-run water scarcity in the village
(WAT.SCRC), as measured by the drop over time in the village groundwater level. Households
in villages where groundwater has on average been falling over the years prior to our study year
appear less likely to use agricultural residues for fuel, and appear to use more dung for fuel. A
possible explanation is that agriculture is less productive in those villages, making agricultural
residue scarcer.
6.4. Planting of Firewood and Fruit Trees. Thus far, we have considered household fuel-use
choices conditional on the number of private ﬁrewood and fruit trees that households have on their
land. The resulting estimates therefore capture the short-run response of households to changes in
the regressors, over a period of time where the household cannot adjust its private tree holdings.
In the long run, however, the household may respond to these changes by planting or uprooting
trees on its land, or altering the proportion of these trees that are ﬁrewood or fruit trees. The two
regressions reported in Table 8 estimate this long-run response.
The ﬁrst equation estimates the likelihood that a household owns any private trees at all, con-
ditional on having some land to plant them on (PR.PRI.TR).8 Not surprisingly, this likelihood
increases signiﬁcantly in the amount of land that households have, as well as in the distance to
the nearest ﬁrewood market. The likelihood does not vary signiﬁcantly with per-capita biomass
availability, however.
849 of the 539 households in our sample are landless.18
The second equation estimates the fraction of private trees that are grown exclusively for ﬁrewood
(FR.FWD.TR). Here, biomass availability clearly does matter: households in villages with degraded
forests are signiﬁcantly more likely to grow ﬁrewood rather than fruit trees on their land. Both
in the short run and the long run, then, households appear to respond to ﬁrewood scarcity in the
commons by increasing their use of privately grown ﬁrewood.
As one might expect, households that own fewer animals (L.ANIMAL), and therefore presumably
have less access to dung for fuel, also grow relatively more private ﬁrewood trees.
6.5. JFM. Finally, we consider how household ﬁrewood collection and consumption patterns diﬀer
between villages with and without JFM projects. The data suggests two possible diﬀerences. First,
as shown in Table 3, the presence of a JFM project in a village appears to reinforce the eﬀect of
higher biomass availability in the commons on the likelihood that households, and in particular
women, collect ﬁrewood. Furthermore, although biomass availability does not appear to aﬀect the
time spent collecting in villages without JFM, it does appear to reduce the time spent collecting in
village with JFM.
Since we separately control for biomass availability, these diﬀerences cannot be explained by
a tendency for villages with JFM projects to have more biomass. It should be noted, however,
that we are only controlling for the volume and not the type of biomass, and therefore one possible
explanation for our ﬁnding is that JFM villages have a more favorable mix of trees in their commons,
with perhaps a larger fraction of ﬁrewood trees. Another possible explanation is that the presence
of JFM projects makes collection of ﬁrewood from the commons a more “legitimate” activity.
Numerous case studies of pre-JFM forest management have documented stories of women being
harassed by state forest guards as they attempted to collect ﬁrewood from the commons; such
collection was viewed suspiciously by forest managers and considered to be responsible for the
rampant degradation of state forest lands. Because JFM projects more clearly deﬁne villagers’
rights to state forest products, women may feel less inhibition about collecting ﬁrewood from the
commons.
The increase in ﬁrewood collection from the commons in JFM villages appears to reduce house-
holds’ reliance on dung for fuel. As shown in the last two columns of Table 6, households in villages
with JFM and high biomass availability are less likely to use dung for fuel, and those that do use
it, use less.19
7. Conclusion
The main objective of this paper is to understand how households in rural India, which are
highly dependent on ﬁrewood as their main source of energy, respond to shortages of ﬁrewood in
village commons. As discussed in the introduction, the prevailing view is that when faced with
such shortages, because non-biofuels are expensive, such households, and especially the women in
those households, have to spend more and more time searching for ﬁrewood. Not only does this
place an ever increasing burden on women, but because it is likely that the increased time devoted
to ﬁrewood collection comes at the expense of time that would be otherwise be spent on income-
generating activities, shortages of ﬁrewood will have additional negative impacts on household
welfare.
Using data from a random sample of rural households in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh,
we come to very diﬀerent conclusions, however. First, we ﬁnd that faced with ﬁrewood shortages
in village forests, households do not spend longer hours searching for ﬁrewood. Instead, fewer
households choose to collect ﬁrewood from degraded forests at all. These households instead switch
to either using ﬁrewood from private trees or to agricultural waste. In the long run, moreover,
households respond to the ﬁrewood shortage by altering the mix of private trees on their land in
favor of ﬁrewood, as opposed to fruit, trees. The latter response oﬀers a more robust, long-term
solution to forest degradation than the more short-term solutions often provided by government-
initiated programs such as the farm forestry program of the 1990s. That said, we nonetheless ﬁnd
that a diﬀerent government program initiated since the 1990s, namely JFM, is having an impact on
the ﬁrewood economy. In villages with JFM projects and relatively high levels of biomass, women
appear to collect more ﬁrewood from the commons, and to spend less time doing so. Only time,
obviously, will tell whether this impact of JFM will be long-lived.20
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Variable Deﬁnitions Mean Standard
Deviation
Time Spent by Household Minutes spent per day in area by household 7.2 1.4
members collecting ﬁrewood
Time Spent by Women Minutes spent per day in area by women 11.1 1.8
members collecting ﬁrewood divided
by the number of working-age women
Firewood from Commons Kilograms of ﬁrewood collected per day from 58.7 14.7
local forests and village common lands
Firewood Bought Kilograms of ﬁrewood bought per day from 7.1 1.3
local markets
Firewood from Own Trees Kilograms of ﬁrewood collected from private 0.1 0
trees per day
Dung as fuel Kilograms of animal manure from own and 0.4 0
common lands used per day as cooking fuel
Ag. Residue as fuel Kilograms of agricultural residue from various 0.1 0
crops used per day as cooking fuel
Fuel Trees Number of babul and low-quality-timber trees 1.2 0.3
owned in June 2000
Fruit Trees Number of trees, other than fuel trees, owned 5.9 0.2
in June 2000
Table 1. Deﬁnitions, means and standard deviations of endogenous variables23
Variable Deﬁnitions Mean Standard
Deviation
Age of Head Age of the head of the household 43.9 0.6
Education of Head Highest class completed by the head of the 2.9 0.3
household
Proportion of Women Number of working-age women divided by the 0.37 0.01
total number of working-age members
Proportion of Children Number of working-age children divided by the 0.28 0.01
total number of working-age members
Land and Farm Capital Number of hectares of land cultivated times the
value of farm capital owned in June 2000 per
working-age member 533832 303798
Animal Holdings Number of bullocks, cows, buﬀaloes, goats, sheep 0.5 0.02
and donkeys owned in June 2000 per working-age
member. As per Jodha (1986), goats and sheep
are given a weight of 0.1 while other animals a
weight of 1
Biomass Availability Thousands of tonnes of timber and fodder biomass 3.2 0.49
available within a 5km radius from the center
of the village divided by the number of households
living in the village
JFM Presence of Joint Forest Management project in
village
Average Depth Average depth in meters of village well monitored by 5.6 0.3
Madhya Pradesh Groundwater Department between
1973 and 2000
Long-run Water Scarcity Diﬀerence in meters between depth of the monitored -0.9 0.4
village well in 1999 and 1973
Rainfall Millimeters of rainfall measured at the 374 18
Block within which the village lies
Distance to Markets Average distance in kilometers between the village and 10 1
markets for agricultural inputs and outputs
Distance to Firewood Distance in kilometers between the village and 1.9 0.6
Markets the closest ﬁrewood market
Firewood Price In-village rupee price of ﬁrewood per kilogram 1.4 0.1









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of Households Kharif Rabi Summer
Collecting Firewood 40 181 208
Purchasing Firewood 33 38 63
Using Dung for Fuel 12 431 254
Table 5. Number of Households that Collect Firewood from Commons, Purchase
Firewood, and Use Dung for Fuel by Season27
Estimation method PROBITRE RE PROBITRE RE PROBITRE RE
Dependent variable P.FWD.COL L.FWD.COL P.FWD.PUR L.FWD.PUR P.DFU.CON L.DFU.CON
HD.AGE –0.011* –0.003 –0.004 –0.003 0.000 –0.001
HD.EDU –0.076*** 0.030** 0.019 –0.011 –0.027** 0.007
PROP.F 0.689 –0.321 –0.203 –0.083 0.124 0.023
PROP.C 0.986** –0.741*** –0.606* 0.243 –0.034 –0.222*
L.LAND×L.CAP –0.025*** 0.001 –0.007 0.009* –0.012** –0.002
L.ANIMAL –0.090 –0.010 0.000 –0.017 0.135*** 0.062***
L.FWD.TR –0.073* –0.000 –0.071** 0.028 0.048** –0.005
L.FRU.TR 0.090** –0.019 –0.086*** –0.021 –0.024 –0.017
L.BIO 0.180** 0.040 0.056 0.071 0.015 0.059***
L.BIO.H×JFM 0.376*** –0.048 –0.077 0.052 –0.223*** –0.078***
AV.DEP –0.066** 0.000 –0.009 –0.010 0.040** 0.010
WTR.SCARCE 0.047 0.013 –0.011 –0.023 0.019 0.017**
RAIN –0.278** –0.025 –0.191 0.039 –0.527** –0.242
MKTDIS.FWD –0.008 0.024** 0.002 0.006 –0.008 –0.000
MKTDIS.AGR 0.030*** 0.008** 0.001 –0.007 –0.009* –0.001
P.FWD 0.031 –0.035 0.150 –0.305*** –0.175** 0.028
KHARIF –0.982*** –0.038 0.378 –0.116 –1.924*** 0.396
SUMMER 0.235** 0.040 0.363*** 0.262*** –1.003*** 0.003
CONSTANT 0.228 1.236*** –0.802* 1.114*** 0.949*** 0.503***
No. of obs. 1617 429 1617 134 1617 697
R2 0.12 0.35 0.12
χ2 185.11*** 40.51*** 50.06*** 62.20*** 291.79*** 56.70***
Table 6. Collection and purchases of ﬁrewood and consumption of dung for fuel.28
Estimation method PROBIT OLS PROBIT OLS
Dependent variable P.FWD.PRI L.FWD.PRI P.CFU.PRI L.CFU.PRI
HD.AGE 0.004 0.002* 0.003 0.000
HD.EDU –0.000 0.015*** –0.016 0.008***
PROP.F –0.456 –0.122 0.234 –0.112
PROP.C 0.170 –0.052 0.425 –0.099
L.LAND×L.CAP –0.004 0.009** 0.026** 0.006***
L.ANIMAL 0.122* –0.050*** 0.095 –0.003
L.FWD.TR 0.231*** 0.033*** 0.068** 0.001
L.FRU.TR 0.268*** 0.030*** 0.034 –0.003
L.BIO –0.152** –0.003 –0.211** 0.006
L.BIO.H×JFM 0.090 0.013 0.115 –0.003
AV.DEP –0.050 –0.000 –0.058 –0.003
WTR.SCARCE 0.005 0.004 –0.064** –0.010*
RAIN 0.000 0.000 –0.000 –0.000
MKTDIS.FWD –0.004 0.004 –0.042 0.002
MKTDIS.AGR –0.014* –0.001 –0.003 –0.001
P.FWD 0.101 –0.043* –0.047 –0.029
CONSTANT –2.215*** –0.181 –0.581 0.156**
No. of obs. 539 253 539 371
R2 0.40 0.22
Table 7. Private production of ﬁrewood and of agricultural residue used for fuel.29
Estimation method PROBIT OLS














No. of obs. 490 472
R2 0.17
Table 8. Ownership of private ﬁrewood and fruit trees.30
Appendix A. First-order Conditions
As described in section 4, the Lagrangian associated with the household’s optimization problem
is
L = U(ca,cf,cr)
+ λB[qa(ta,La) + pfqf
c(tf;Ff
c ) + pfqf
p(Ff
p ) + prqr
p(Fr
p) + wtw + v − ca − pfcf − prcr]
+ λT[T − ta − tf − tw]
+ λF[L − La − Ff
p − Fr
p]
+ µc[cf − qf
c(tf;Ff
c ) − qf
p(Ff
p )]
+ µttf + µwtw + µfFf
p + µrFr
p,












∂cr − λBpr = 0, (13)
∂L
∂ta = λB∂qa
∂ta − λT = 0, (14)
∂L
∂tf = λBpf ∂qf
c
∂tf − λT − µc∂qf
c
∂tf + µt = 0, (15)
∂L




















− λF + µr = 0, (18)
∂L
∂La = λB ∂qa
∂La − λF = 0. (19)31
















∂tf − λT − µc∂qf
c
∂tf + µt = 0, (23)
∂U




















∂La − λF = 0. (27)
















































∂La + µr = 0, (33)32













































∂La + µr = 0
Appendix B. Analysis













































∂La = 0, (39)






∂ta = 0, (40)
w −
∂qa(ta,La)
















∂La = 0. (43)33





∂qa(T − tf − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)
∂ta = 0, (44)
w −
∂qa(T − tf − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)







∂qa(T − tf − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)







∂qa(T − tf − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)
∂La = 0. (47)




∂tf − w = 0, (48)
w −
∂qa(T − tf − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)







∂qa(T − tf − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)







∂qa(T − tf − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)
∂La = 0. (51)
Treat (48) as implicitly deﬁning a function tf(F
f













Substitute this function into the other three equations:
w −
∂qa(T − tf(Ff
c ,pf,w) − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)








c ,pf,w) − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)








c ,pf,w) − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)
∂La = 0. (55)







π = wtw + pfqf
p(Ff
p ) + prqr
p(Fr
p) + qa(T − tf(Ff
c ,pf,w) − tw,L − Ff
p − Fr
p).34
Totally diﬀerentiate with respect to the three endogenous variables and the variable tf, which we



















































































































Assuming the second-order condition is satisﬁed, which requires the determinant D of the ﬁrst







































since the determinant in the numerator is identical to D, except that the ﬁrst column is multiplied






































































for the same reason.35






































































Case II: only the non-negativity constraints on F
f
p , and Fr
p bind (so the household













































∂La + µr = 0, (61)
Since µf and µr each enter only one equation, their value can be determined after solving the re-
maining four equations together with the two constraints (1) and (2) for the remaining six unknowns
(ca, cf, cr, ta, tf, and tw).






∂ta = 0, (62)
w −
∂qa(ta,La)
∂ta = 0. (63)
(64)36





∂qa(T − tf − tw,La)
∂ta = 0, (65)
w −
∂qa(T − tf − tw,La)
∂ta = 0. (66)
(67)




∂tf − w = 0, (68)
w −
∂qa(T − tf − tw,La)
∂ta = 0. (69)
We now have a recursive system where equation (68) implicitly deﬁnes a function tf(F
f
c ,pf,w) and,
after substituting this function into (69), the latter implicitly deﬁnes a function tw(F
f
c ,pf,w).



































































Case III: only the non-negativity constraint on tw binds (so the household does not













































∂La = 0, (77)
Since µw enters only equation (75), its value can be determined after solving the remaining ﬁve
equations together with the three constraints (1), (2), and (3) for the remaining eight unknowns


























∂La = 0. (80)





∂qa(T − tf,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)







∂qa(T − tf,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)







∂qa(T − tf,L − Ff
p − Fr
p)
∂La = 0. (83)









c ) + pfqf
p(Ff
p ) + prqr
p(Fr
p) + qa(T − tf,L − Ff
p − Fr
p).38































































































































Assuming the second-order condition is satisﬁed, which requires the determinant D of the ﬁrst




















































































































































































































































































































Case IV: only the non-negativity constraints on tw and Fr
p bind (so the household













































∂La + µr = 0, (89)
Since µw and µr each enter only one equation, their value can be determined after solving the
remaining four equations together with the two constraints (1) and (2) for the remaining 6 unknowns
(ca, cf, cr, ta, tf, and F
f
p ).














∂La = 0. (91)
Use (2) and our assumption that tw = 0 to substitute away ta, and use (3) and our assumption
that Fr





∂qa(T − tf,L − Ff
p )







∂qa(T − tf,L − Ff
p )
∂La = 0. (93)








c ) + pfqf
p(Ff
p ) + qa(T − tf,L − Ff
p − Fr
p).








































Assuming the second-order condition is satisﬁed, which requires the determinant D of the ﬁrst







































































































































Case V: the non-negativity constraints on tw and F
f
p bind (so the household does not
engage in wage labor and has no private ﬁrewood trees, although it does have private42













































∂La = 0, (99)
Since µw and µf each enter only one equation, their value can be determined after solving the
remaining four equations together with the three constraints (1), (2), and (3) for the remaining
seven unknowns (ca, cf, cr, ta, tf, Fr
p, and La).














∂La = 0. (101)
Use (2) and our assumption that tw = 0 to substitute away ta, and use (3) and our assumption
that F
f





∂qa(T − tf,L − Fr
p)







∂qa(T − tf,L − Fr
p)
∂La = 0. (103)







c ) + pfqr
p(Fr
p) + qa(T − tf,L − Fr
p).





































Assuming the second-order condition is satisﬁed, which requires the determinant D of the ﬁrst






































































































































Case VI: the non-negativity constraints on tw, F
f
p , and Fr
p bind (so the household
does not engage in wage labor and has no private ﬁrewood or fruit trees, although it44













































∂La + µr = 0, (109)
Since µw, µf, and µr each enter only one equation, their value can be determined after solving
the remaining three equations together with the two constraints (1) and (2) for the remaining ﬁve
unknowns (ca, cf, cr, ta, and tf).






∂ta = 0. (110)






∂ta = 0. (111)
(112)












































Using (2) and our assumption that tw = 0,
dta
dFf
c
= −
∂tf
∂Ff
c |{z}
(+)
< 0.